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PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF NEW PROCEDURES
IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Ralph M. Patterson'
During the past several years there
has been in Michigan considerable in-
terest manifested in the control of
criminal psychopaths. The attention of
the public was focused on the sexual
psychopaths in particular and an at-
tempt was made to obtain more strin-
gent control over these unfortunate
and dangerous individuals. These ef-
forts were crystallized in 1937 by the
enactment of the "Goodrich Law."
However, since various features of this
act met with the disapproval of the
State Supreme Court, it was declared
unconstitutional. In no way daunted
by this frustration, the Michigan State
Legislature exerted itself to construct
a constitutionally secure law which
would provide rigid control over what
were called criminal sexual psycho-
pathic persons. This zealous application
culminated in 1939 with the enactment
of "An act to define criminal sexual
psychopathic persons and to provide for
the commitment of such persons and
the procedure therefor."' This same
session also saw the passage of an act
which provides for a psychiatric ex-
amination of all individuals charged
with murder.' Since these two acts
promote striking changes in procedure,
it seems propitious to review at this
I Neuropsychiatric Institute, University Hospi-
tal. Ann Arbor, Michigan.
- No. 196. Public Acts of Mich.. 1937.
•No. 165, Public Acts of Mich.. 1939.
time the role of the psychiatrist in
court and to develop, if possible, a cer-
tain uniformity of attitude and ap-
proach.
When the criminal court first rec-
ognized the concept of mental illness
there was no need for psychiatric or
expert testimony to determine the
presence or absence of insanity. Any
ordinary person -was able to determine
responsibility or irresponsibility ac-
cording to the principles defined by
Coke5 in 1671: "He that is non compos
mentis and totally deprived of all com-
passings and imaginations, cannot com-
mit high treason * * but it must be
absolute madness, and total deprivation
of memory." It is apparent that this
narrow definition was strictly adhered
to during the next half-century, for one
finds the following re-statement during
the trial of Arnold6: "It must be a man
that is totally deprived of his under-
standing and memory and does not
know what he is doing, no more than
an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast,
such a one is never the object of pun-
ishment." There is evidence .that the
court was beginning at this time to
entertain the philosophical concept of
the "knowledge of right or wrong" for
it was stated that a man was respon-
4No. 259, Public Acts of Mich., 1939.
5 Coke, Edw.: The Third Part of the Institutes
of the Laws of England. p. 6, 1671.




sible: "wfo knew what he was doing,
and was able to distinguish whether he
was doing good or evil, and understood
what he did." Towards the end of the
eighteenth century the court began to
acknowledge the existence of what was
called "partial insanity" but refused to
recognize this as a defense on the
grounds of insanity. To quote from
Hale-: "They have a competent use of
reason in respect to some subjects * *
and yet are not wholly destitute of the
use of reason: and thispartial insanity
seems not to excuse them in the com-
mitting of any offense * * * . It is very
difficult to define the indivisible line
that divides perfect and'partial insanity
* * * a total alienation of the mind, or
perfect madness; this excuses from the
guilt of felony and treason." As the
court became more and more inclined
to accept the defense of partial insanity
it became necessary to call upon expert
witnesses so that by the beginning of
the nineteenth century the psychia-
trist, if we may call him such, was in-
vited to testify before the criminal
court. The psychiatrist then, as now,
was inclined to possess a somewhat dif-
ferent point of view than the court and
one finds Benjamin Rush," the father
of American psychiatry, writing on
"moral derangement" and of rescuing
certain individuals afflicted with this
disease from the arm of the law "to
render them the subjects of the kind
and lenient hand of medicine:"
7 Hale, Matthew: The History of the Pleas of
the Crown, p. 30, 1778.
8 Rush, Benjamin: Medical Inquiries and Ob-
servations upon the Diseases of the Mind, p. 264.
Philadelphia, 1812.
9 Stephen, James Fitzjames: A History of the
Criminal Law in England. Vol. 2, p. 153 et seq.
1883.
The acquittal of McNaghton 9 in 1843
on the grounds of partial, or as it was
then popularly known, "delusional in-
sanity," aroused considerable public
reaction. This prompted the House of
Lords to put certain pertinent ques-
tions to the judges and this august body
of fifteen men answered questions 2
and 3 in part as follows: "That to
establish a defense on the grounds of
insanity, it must be clearly proved that
at the time of committing the act, the
accused was laboring under such a de-
fect of reason from disease of the mind
as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing, or if he did
know it that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong." If the "opin-
ions of the judges" had been rendered
before the trial of McNaughton he
would probably never have been ac-
quitted. In co2psequence of this un-
precedented questioning by the House
of Lords, the criminal court entered an
era of relative inflexibility which per-
sists to date. The pleas of Prichard, 10
Ray," and others,1 2 all leading psychia-
trists of their time, went quite unno-
ticed. Ray was probably far in advance
of the period, for he remarked that the
right versus wrong test: "furnishes no
protection to that class of the insane
who entertain no specific delusion, but
act from momentary irresistible im-
pulses, or diseased moral perceptions."
This introduction of the unscientific
concept: "irresistible impulse" in 1853
1o Prichard, James Cowles: A Treatise on In-
sanity and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind.
Philadelphia, 1837.
11 Ray, I.: Treatise on the Medical Jurispru-
dence of Insanity, pp. 38, 46, 61, 66. Boston, 1853.
12 Moral Insanity, Am. J. Insanity. 14:311, 1858.
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anticipated acquittals on this defense
by more than half a century. To quote
further from this outstanding scientist
of nearly a century ago: "It would be
far better if we had a class of men * * *
peculiarly fitted for duty by a course
of studies expressly directed to this end
* * * appointed by the government * * *
ready, at the call of the court, to ex-
amine the health of criminals, draw up
reports touching the same, and deliver
opinions." He further recommends
that if the question of insanity should
arise the defendant ought to be placed
in a hospital for the insane for a period
of study and observation. These words
of wisdom fell on the ground made
sterile by the famous McNaughton
trial, for even now relatively few courts
and very few states permit the carry-
ing out of such procedures. Another
voice in the wilderness, that of Falret"
likewise went unheeded. His remarks,
which are most interesting and might
have been made to-day rather than in
1867, were as follows: "Instead of fix-
ing our principal attention upon the
act with which he is charged, and which
is submitted to our investigation, let
us abandon this narrow and excliisive
point of view, to consider the individual
as a whole, in his entire physical and
moral constitution, in his past, his pres-
ent and his future. Let us make, in a
word, a medical examination as we
would in the case of a patient laboring
under any other form of disease. Let
us, then cease to waste words in dis-
cussing the fluctuating and arbitrary
limits which theoretically divide sin.
-Falret. Jules: On Moral Insanity. Am. J.
Insanity. 23:407. 1867. pp. 420-421.
passion and natural mental errors, from
morbid ideas and feelings of insanity.
Let us study, clinically, the whole body
of physical and moral phenomena
which the history and present condition
of our patient affords. Let us bring
together all who have any knowledge
of him, and trace back as far as pos-
sible into his past, even to his birth and
ancestry. * * * Again, let us com-
pare the individual with himself in dif-
ferent periods of his life; with the mode
of thinking, the conduct, ideas, feelings
and acts common to men in the same
condition of life as his own. Let us
judge him by the criterion .of common
sense, and in the light of the prevailing
ideas, the manners and social customs
of his age, * * * for, in this standard
of common sense, with the numerous
variations possible to it in individual
cases, lies the primary point of com-
parison for us, by which, in the last
analysis, we may decide between rea-
son and insanity." Despite this and
other masterful pleas for abandonment
of the archaic punitive philosophy and
procedure -there was no observable
change until the very last decade of
the ninefeenth century 'Ransom,1 4 a
physician at the New York State Prison
at Dannemora, had the temerity to
bring up again at that time the ques-
tion of moral insanity and of "irre-
sistible impulse." He also called at-
tention to the fact that there were
what he termed "psychopathic crim-
inals" who had to be approached and
treated in a fashion different from that
used for the ordinary criminal. He
"4Ransom, Julius B.: The Physician and the
Criminal. J. A. M. A.. 27:788. 1896.
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was further supported by McDonald' 5
who insisted that responsibility, i.e.,
punishability, should rest on the exist-
ence or non-existence of mental dis-
ease. He emphasizes further that the
defendant in order to be responsible
must have sufficient mental capacity
to rationally appreciate the nature and
consequence of the act he is commit-
ting and have sufficient power of will
to enable him to choose between doing
it and not doing it. He elucidates
further that if the defendant is to be
considered irresponsible he must have
lost the power of choosing, with refer-
ence to the particular act, due to men-
tal disease. The State of Michigan does
recognize the very questionable defense
of "irresistible impulse" but the rules
laid down by the judges following the
trial of McNaughton tend to dominate
the courts. Prior to 1939 the psychia-
trist in a circuit court in Michigan was
subjected to the same form of focal
questioning and confusing hypothetical
questions as of the preceding fifty or
seventy-five years. No change could be
expected so long as the criminal law
remained punitive in purpose and the
only call for psychiatric testimony was
to aid in the determination of punish-
ability.
Although defendants charged with
murder or criminal sexual psychopathy
will be treated differently, procedure
otherwise will continue to be based on
punitive English law. Whether out-
moded or modern philosophies are fol-
lowed, in either case certain questions
15McDonald, Carlos F.: Am. J. Insanity.
56:21, 1899.
16East, W. S.: The Modern Psychiatric Ap-
proach to Crime. J. Ment. Sc. 85:649. 1939.
of psychiatric policy arise. Is it advis-
able or is it necessary for the psychia-
trist to state whether the defendant
knew "right from wrong" or the "na-
ture and quality of the act" or that he
was "responsible or irresponsible"?
East '" remarks that the weakness of
medical evidence in the criminal trial
is often due to the attempt of the psy-
chiatrist to prove too much and con-
fuse the difference between irrespon-
sibility according to law and to medi-
cine. In a medical sense this term re-
fers to mental health whereas the legal
connotation is that of punishability.
East further emphasizes that the psy-
chiatrist's report should be of such de-
tail and clarity as to permit conclu-
sions regarding the culpability of the
defendant. In this light he urges the
adoption of the term "culpable" and
assiduous avoidance of the presenta-
tions of any conclusions in regard to
the defendant's responsibility. He con-
siders it quite unnecessary and, in fact,
unscientific for the psychiatrist to per-
mit himself to become involved in any
discussion of the legal concept of
"knowledge of the nature and quality
of the act" or the question of "right
versus wrong." Overholser T supports
this viewpoint, insisting particularly
that the expert avoid making any con-
clusions regarding the responsibility of
the defendant. The legal profession and
the public accuse the psychiatrist of
extravagant claims, unreliability of
diagnosis, fantastic testimony, disagree-
ments among themselves, etc., but the
7 Overholser, Winifred: The Place of Psychi-
atry in the Criminal Law. Boston Univ. Law
Rev. 16:322. 1936.
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attorneys in making such accusations
seem rather blind to the nature and
quality of the questions asked. As cor-
rectly and wisely stated by Ray":
"Much of the unmerited distrust of ex-
perts' testimony springs from the man-
ner in which it is elicited." He also
offers a solution as follows: "This evil
would be entirely avoided if the testi-
mony of experts would be given in
writing and read to the jury without
any oral examination."
Although the psychiatrist may feel
inclined to criticize the present pro-
cedure, the legal profession cannot be
accused of apathy. On the contrary,
lawyers interested in criminal law are
making energetic efforts to eliminate
the punitive approach and thus improve
trial procedure; permitting at the same
time introduction of treatment meth-
ods. Beccle,'9 for example, in a recent
article on Modern Medico-legal Trends
discusses the question of sex offenses
and what to do with the offender. His
inability to arrive at any satisfactory
solution may perhaps be due to no
fault of the legal profession but rather
to the failure of the psychiatrist to pro-
vide the proper answer.
Cooperative effort has indeed pro-
duced tangible results in the State of
Michigan. By the passage of the afore-
mentioned act concerning sex offen-
ders, our state has the unique distinc-
tion of being the first to recognize any
relationship between culpability and
psychopathic personality. Thus a med-
ical term has been admitted to the bar,
even though the term is of questionable
IS Ray. I.: Contributions to Mental Pathology.
Boston. 1873. p. 428.
- Beccle, L. F.: Some Modern Medico-legal
scientific merit. Undoubtedly, the act
concerning sexual psychopaths was not
intended as a recognition of scientific
progress, but was, on the contrary, pro-
mulgated for the purpose of giving a
sexual offender who might otherwise
get three to five years, indefinite or
lifelong incarceration. This is substan-
tiated by the provisions for discharge,
which latter cannot be accomplished
until the accused has fully and per-
manently recovered. Whatever may be
the purpose and intent of the law, it
represents a definite social and scien-
tific advancement. The act does possess
certain regrettable features, the most
-important probably being the discre-
tionary power given to the prosecuting
attorney. He is not required to demand
a psychiatric examination of a person
accused of a sexual crime but may, if
he wishes to consider the accused a
possible criminal sexual psychopath,
then request psychiatric examination.
There are, of course, possible advan-
tages to this freedom of action given
to prosecutors but it permits consider-
able variance in procedure throughout
the state and allows the subjective
reactions of the prosecutor to influence
his course of conduct.
For example, L. A. (Case No. 447604)
recently studied at The Neuropsychia-
tric Institute had been known to have
some homosexual leanings for many
years. He indulged in mutual mastur-
bation in adolescence and continued this
practice in early adult life until mar-
ried at the age of twenty-three Fol-
lowing the loss of his wife when he was
thirty-five, he continued to indulge in
similar practices on infrequent occa-
Trends. Med.-Leg. and Criminol. Rev. 6:261.
1938.
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sions. At the age of fifty-two he han-
dled the genitalia of a youth of nineteen
and was charged with soliciting an act
of gross indecency. During the initial
hearing the defense introduced the
question of whether this was an act of
gross indecency or simply indecency.
Since this seemed to be a somewhat
debatable point, the prosecution then
decided to pursue the case as that of a
criminal sexual psychopath. It was al-
leged locally that this change of pro-
cedure was in fact a political maneuver,
the prosecution wishing to be as severe
as circumstances permitted.
Another feature of the act which
might be questioned is the commitment
of the criminal sexual psychopath to
the jurisdiction of the State Hospital
Commission. Although this body has
at the present time one psychiatrist
.amongst its personnel, the commission
is essentially a lay body. This lay
organization then determines the hos-
pital or correctional institution to which
the psychopath is to be sent and also
decides when and under what circum-
stances he may be paroled and when
he may be discharged as fully and
permanently recovered. It is question
able whether such a group can con-
sistently practice sound scientific crim-
inology and psychiatry and whether
such a group will be as receptive as
they should of the recommendations
presented to them by the superintend-
ent of the hospital wherein the de-
fendant is confined.
Approaching this subject from the
strictly psychiatric viewpoint, leaving
out for the moment public feeling, one
wonders why only the sexual psycho-
path should be considered as mentally
ill and thus less culpable or less
responsible in a legal sense for his
criminal act. Why should not other
psychopaths with criminal propensities,
such as the emotionally unstable, liars
and swindlers, etc., be given similar
consideration? Legal attitudes have
encompassed this concept for some time
as demonstrated by the article of
Jacobs"0' and other attorneys who have
likened criminality to insanity.
T. D. (Case No. 455591) illustrates
this point in question very clearly. As
an adolescent this man had consider-
able difficulty in adjusting to the home
situation and was considered in his
early youth as stubborn, rebellious and
irresponsible. Because of these diffi-
ties, he left home at the age of nineteen.
At twenty-two he was charged and
eventually sentenced for assault with
intent to rape. He left the reformatory
after some three years and was for a
brief .time an itinerant worker and then
joined the Army, hoping by means of a
uniform and an honorable discharge to
overcome his feeling of inadequacy.
During his Army service he was in the
"brig" a number of times for drunken
and disorderly conduct and for being
absent without leave. At the age of
thirty, some time after discharge, he
married and within a year after mar-
riage demonstrated pathological emo-
tional instability in the form of explo-
sive angry outbursts. These outbursts,
characterized by fighting, threatening
with a dangerous weapon (shot-gun, re-
volver, knife, etc.) continued,-being fre-
quently aggravated by alcoholism. The
number of arrests, fines, and jail sen-
tences was substantially increased by
such difficulties as, transportation of
liquor, larceny, and disorderly conduct.
At the age of fifty-two he was charged
with incest and was finally committed
as a criminal sexual psychopath. In re-
viewing his adjustment over a period
of years, it is at once obvious that he
has been a dangerous individual, un-
questionably psychopathic, and should
have been under some form of protec-
tive detention long before.
20 Jacobs. Charles M.: Why Crime and Insan-
ity. Med.-Leg. J. 45:4. 1928.
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The criminal code of Germany as
revised in 19332" provides for such
detention but only after the accused
has served a sentence. This method of
dealing with such individuals consti-
tutes a double jeopardy and was one
of the reasons for the condemning of
the Goodrich Law of 1937 as unconsti-
tutional. Nevertheless, it does have the
advantage of providing a prolonged and
indeterminate detention of all danger-
ous individuals and is not limited
exclusively to sexual psychopaths as is
the act under consideration. Irrespec-
tive of the handicaps mentioned, the
present act is a definite forward step
and offers an avenue for social reform
of scientific character in the field of
criminology.
A century ago Cooper2 2 criticised the
testimony of the medical profession,
accusing the expert of wishing to
ramble through the whole life of the
defendant rather than limiting himself
to the particular question at hand. We
now have the opportunity of doing that
very thing, though not, it is hoped, in
a rambling fashion. The psychiatrist
now has the liberty of presenting a
complete case study, which may include
a careful consideration of the defend-
ant's ancestry, social background, per-
sonal history, personality development,
even the psychodynamic factors con-
cerned with the charge pending. The
psychiatrist is not only permitted to
present a full report of the defendant's
personality as a whole but he may also
21 Mannheim, Hermann: The German Preven-
tion of Crime Act, 1933. J. Crim. Law and Crim-
inol. 26:517. 1935.
make recommendations and offer a
prognosis. The presentation of the
defendant's past, present and future as
recommended by Falret in 1867 has
finally become an actuality. If the
reports are full and complete, couched
in simple understandable language,
presenting a practical and conservative
viewpoint, they should go far towards
enhancing the position of the psychia-
trist in the criminal court. Although
the number of cases studied in The
Neuropsychiatric Institute has been as
yet limited in number, the cooperation
received from the courts has been very
gratifying and in only one instance has
it been necessary for a psychiatrist to
appear in court to testify. Since the
filing of a complete report eliminates
the need of a personal appearance in
most instances, the psychiatrist is not
faced with either the hypothetical
question or cross-questioning. Avoiding
thus those factors which lead to the
disfavor and discredit of the psychia-
trist in the criminal court, it should not
be difficult to correct most if not all of
the accusations, both fair and unfair.
leveled at expert testimony.
If practical, conservative, complete
reports can convince the court of the
value of psychiatric examination the
liasion thus cultivated would promote
more progressive criminology in the
State of Michigan. The first step of
progress would be the fulfillment of
the recommendations of the American
Bar Association 3 which are as follows:
22 Cooper, Thomas: Tracts on Medical Juris-
prudence. Philadelphia, 1819.
2. Report of the 52nd Annual Meetln- of the
Am. Bar. Assoc. 1929. p. 56.
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"1. That there be available to every
criminal and juvenile court a psychia-
tric service to assist the court in the
disposition of offenders. 2. That no
criminal be sentenced for any felony in
any case in which the judge has any
discretion as to sentence until there
be filed as a part of the record a
psychiatric report. 3. That there be a
psychiatric service available to every
penal and correctional institution. 4.
That there be a psychiatric report on
every prisoner convicted of a felony
before he is released. 5. That there
be established in each state a complete
system of administrative transfer and
parole and that there be no decision
for or against any parole or any trans-
fer from one institution to another
without a psychiatric report."
The second step would be fulfillment
of the recommendations of the National
Crime Commission,24 namely that each
court have available not only psychia-
tric service but psychologists and social
investigators, the work of this tribunal
being furthered by the enactment of a
law similar in principle to the Briggs
Law of Massachusetts.
The momentum thus gained -would
permit eventually the achievement of
a third, more radical advancemkent,
specifically a "treatment commission"
to whom the court would commit all
defendants for observation, study, and
planning of correctional measures.
Such -a program would require an
extension of the elasticity of the present
21 National Crime Commission Committee's
Report on the Medical Aspects of Crime.
- Lindholm, A. C.: Status of Parole Proceed-
ings Am. Prison Assoc. 1938, p, 381.
26 Bryee, P.: Moral and Criminal Responsibil-
indeterminate scntence, perhaps to the
point of making the sentence wholly
indeterminate. Michigan 25 was the first
state to establish the indeterminate
sentence in 1860, ten years before such
procedure was recommended by the
Prison Congress. It is hoped Michigan
may again bear the torch of progress.
The concept of a treatment commis-
sion, treatment tribunal, or planning
commission is far from new, though
never placed in actual practice to the
extent of taking the sentencing power
away from the court. Bryce -6 recom-
mended the appointment of such a
commission of experts as early as 1888,
suggesting that after examination and
study they prescribe the treatment and
determine the place for and duration
of detention. Allison voiced similar
views a decade later and during recent
years numerous references have been
made to such a treatment board. The
American Law Institute28 has been
active in developing an act which
would sentence youths under twenty-
one to such a commission, said youths
being outside the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. According to this plan
the commission would be composed of
an educator, sociologist, psychiatrist,
and criminologist, they in turn employ-
ing other assistants or experts to aid
them when necessary. Although there
is no theoretical reason for limiting
such a plan to this age range, neverthe-
less, the focusing of such a program on
the youthful offender would doubtless
ity. Alienist and Neurologist. 9:428, 1888.
27 Allison, H. E.: What Constitutes an Insane
Criminal. Albany Medical Annals. 18:569, 1897.
28 American Law Institute: Criminal Justice-
Youth. Unpublished communication.
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produce the quickest statistical and,
it is hoped, the most convincing results.
Under such a regime there would be
no need of separating more than a few
of the criminal sexual psychopaths
from other psychopaths and ordinary
criminals. Instead of following the
present trend of placing more criminals
under psychiatric supervision in men-
tal hospitals, the trend would be to
place more psychiatrists in the field of
criminology. Such a course would be
more logical and more practical, though
perhaps not more economical if proper-
ly carried out.
Surenurry
Prior to the termination of the
eighteenth century the psychiatrist
played little or no role in the criminal
court. Since that time there has been
an increasing demand for expert testi-
mony in keeping with the broadening
concept or irresponsibility. During the
past fifty years attempts have been
made to extend this concept to include
borderline mental conditions and "ir-
resistible impulses." As a consequence
of this and the manner of questioning
psychiatric testimony acquired a most
unsavory reputation. The State of
Michigan has made a definite advance-
ment in the field of criminology by
providing for psychiatric examination
of defendants charged with murder and
of individuals alleged to be criminal
sexual psychopaths. Although these
laws do possess certain handicaps they
offer the psychiatrist an opportunity to
present to the court a written case
study, i. e., a complete longitudinal
section report of the accused's past,
present and future. By presentation of
adequate, practical and conservative
case summaries the psychiatrist's repu-
tation may be elevated and courts
convinced of the advantages of indi-
vidualized criminology. By forsaking
the punitive approach the recommen-
dations of the American Bar Associa-
tion may be fulfilled. With further
progress, one might look forward to
the establishment of a "treatment
commission" composed of a social
investigator, psychologist, psychiatrist
and others as indicated. All offenders
would then be committed to this com-
mission and corrective measures, pre-
ventive detention, hospitalization, parole
or probation would be under its
supervision. Confusing and contradic-
tory expert testimony now so prevalent
would be largely eliminated from the
courts. The general trend would avoid
placing more criminals in psychiatric
hospitals but would place more psychia-
trists in the field of criminology.
